Gordon Tima v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-24-2015 
Gordon Tima v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Gordon Tima v. Attorney General United States" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 288. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/288 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3935 
_____________ 
 
GORDON NDOK TIMA, 
                                    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                             Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A072-378-036) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Rosalind K. Malloy  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2015 
 
Before:   SMITH, JORDAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: March 24, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Gordon Ndok Tima, a native and citizen of Cameroon, seeks review of 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for a 
waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).  For the following reasons, we 
will grant his petition and remand the matter to the BIA for further proceedings.  
I.  Background  
  
 Tima was admitted to the United States in 1989 as a nonimmigrant student.  On 
September 22, 1994, his status was adjusted to conditional permanent resident after he 
got married to Sandra Marr, a United States citizen.  On July 3, 1995, Marr gave a sworn 
statement to the Immigration and Nationalization Service that her marriage to Tima was a 
sham entered into only so Tima could obtain United States citizenship.  Later, Tima was 
charged by an information in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia with one count of making false statements concerning his marriage, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  In 1996, he pled guilty to that charge.  As part of the plea, he 
admitted that the marriage was a sham.  In early 1997, Tima and Marr divorced, and he 
married Florence Fomundam, who was then a citizen of Cameroon, but became a 
naturalized U.S. citizen in 2002.  Tima and Fomundam have three children, all of whom 
are United States citizens.   
  The Department of Homeland Security served Tima with a notice to appear in 
2005 and, in 2008, filed it with the appropriate administrative agency.1  The notice to 
appear charged that Tima was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(G)(ii) for 
entering a marital agreement for the purpose of procuring admission as an immigrant (the 
                                              
 1 The 2005-2008 notice to appear was the third notice that the Department of 
Homeland Security served on Tima.  It had previously served him with notices in 1996 
and 1997, but had failed to file them. 
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“marriage fraud” charge), and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because he was 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (the “CIMT” charge), namely the false 
statement conviction stemming from the sham marriage.  Tima denied his removability 
and sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which allows an 
alien who was inadmissible at the time of admission because he sought to procure an 
immigration benefit through fraud, but who is now related to a United States citizen, to 
seek a waiver of his removability.  The government opposed the fraud waiver and, in 
2010, filed an additional charge of removability, claiming that Tima was removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) because his conditional permanent residence status was 
terminated automatically in 1996 when he failed to file a Form I-7512 and, further, that 
his status was terminated pursuant to a Notice of Termination issued in 2010 based on his 
criminal conviction.  Tima admitted that he failed to file the Form I-751.   
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the charges of removability based on 
marriage fraud and the failure to file an I-751 form.  In a subsequent ruling, the IJ 
pretermitted Tima’s application for a fraud waiver and sustained the CIMT charge of 
removability.  Tima argued at a later hearing that he was eligible for the fraud waiver.  
The IJ reconsidered her ruling in that regard and found Tima statutorily eligible for a 
waiver of the marriage-fraud charge of removability.  The IJ, however, did not reach 
whether Tima’s application warranted a favorable exercise of discretion because the IJ 
                                              
 2 Form I-751 is a Petition to Remove the Conditions on Residence.  The form must 
be filed within 90 days before the second anniversary of when an alien obtains 
conditional lawful permanent residence.  Failure to file results in the automatic 
termination of permanent residence status.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1216.4(a)(1),(6). 
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decided that Tima remained removable based on his failure to file a Form I-751 and on 
the CIMT charge, which, according to the IJ, were two grounds for removal to which the 
fraud waiver did not extend.    
 On appeal to the BIA, Tima disputed that the fraud waiver does not apply to the 
CIMT and Form I-751 charges of removability.  He essentially argued that the waiver 
applies to all of the charges because they all emanate from a single instance of fraud.  The 
BIA disagreed and upheld the IJ’s decision.  It did not address whether the fraud waiver 
applies to the CIMT charge but concluded, as had the IJ, that Tima’s failure to file a 
Form I-751 terminated his lawful status and that he is not eligible for a fraud waiver for 
the resulting inadmissibility.  Tima never challenged the finding that his marriage fraud 
conviction was a CIMT nor did he seek a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which provides 
a discretionary remedy for an alien who has committed a CIMT and is otherwise 
removable but who is married to a United States citizen and whose removal would create 
an extreme hardship to the alien or his citizen-spouse.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  
 On August 27, 2013, the BIA dismissed Tima’s appeal and this timely petition for 
review followed.  The government has moved to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.   
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II.  Discussion3  
 A.  Jurisdiction 
 As a threshold matter, we consider the government’s challenge to our jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2008).  We lack jurisdiction to 
review the denial of discretionary relief, including cancellation of removal,  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but we may review “constitutional claims or questions of law raised 
upon a petition for review... .” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Our jurisdiction in that respect is 
“narrowly circumscribed” in that it is limited to “colorable constitutional claims or 
questions of law.”  Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
  Tima presents four arguments in his brief: (1) the fraud waiver applies to the order 
of removal for failure to file a Form I-751 because that failure was related to his marriage 
fraud; (2) termination of status for failure to file a Form I-751 is related to removal for 
fraud when an alien is convicted of marriage fraud before the 2-year anniversary of 
conditional lawful permanent resident status, and an alien should not be required to file a 
meritless Form I-751 in order to be eligible for a fraud waiver; (3) the BIA erred in 
pretermitting his application for a fraud waiver because, if the waiver is granted with 
respect to the marriage fraud charge of removability, it must also operate to waive 
                                              
 3 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3); our jurisdiction pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) is disputed and is addressed herein.  We review the BIA’s legal 
conclusions de novo, subject to the principles outlined in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 
2010).  There are no facts at issue. 
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removability for failure to file the Form I-751 and for the CIMT charge, as those charges 
directly result from the underlying fraud charge; and (4) the BIA erred in holding that his 
conditional permanent residence status terminated upon failing to file a Form I-751 
because his status had already terminated when the Attorney General determined that he 
had committed marriage fraud.   
 In its motion to dismiss, the government asserts that we should dismiss Tima’s 
petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because he never challenged his removability 
for committing a CIMT or sought a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The government 
argues that Tima did not exhaust his administrative remedies and that the CIMT remains 
an independent basis for removal.  That argument, however, is misplaced.  As Tima notes 
in his response to the government’s motion, he sought a fraud waiver to the charge of 
removability for committing a CIMT under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).  The question of 
whether the fraud waiver applies to the CIMT charge was therefore raised before the BIA 
and is properly before us.  It is immaterial whether Tima challenged the CIMT 
determination or sought a waiver under Section 1182(h) because the overarching legal 
issue of whether a fraud waiver can extend to the CIMT charge and to the Form I-751 
charge was preserved, as was Tima’s argument on the legal effect of his failure to file 
that form.  Accordingly, we have jurisdiction.   
 B.   Grounds for Removal 
 Turning to the merits of Tima’s arguments, there were, as we have noted, three 
asserted grounds for Tima’s removal: marriage fraud, failure to file the Form I-751, and 
committing a CIMT.  The IJ and the BIA correctly noted that the marriage fraud charge 
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was subject to the fraud waiver provision, but concluded that the failure to file Form I-
751 and CIMT charge were not subject to that waiver.  They thus did not reach the 
question of whether a discretionary waiver was appropriate.  Tima asks us to extend the 
fraud waiver provision in § 1227(a)(1)(H) to reach his commission of a CIMT and his 
failure to file a Form I-751.  
 First, we need not consider whether the Section 1227 waiver reaches the failure to 
file the Form I-751, however, because the BIA’s decision is infirm for another, perhaps 
dispositive, reason.  The failure to file a Form I-751, under the facts of this case, cannot 
be understood to have the effect the government claims.  Because Form I-751 must be 
filed within 90 days before the second anniversary of when an alien obtains conditional 
lawful permanent residence, Tima’s Form I-751 would have been due on or about ninety 
days prior to September 22, 1996.  The form would have required Tima to declare, under 
penalty of perjury, that his marriage to Marr was not for the purposes of obtaining 
immigration benefits.  Before the form was due, however, he had pled guilty to entering 
into a sham marriage to Marr to obtain immigration benefits.  Thus, if he had submitted 
the Form I-751, he would have committed perjury.  Notwithstanding those historical 
facts, the IJ and the BIA, relying on Garawan v. INS, 91 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1996), held 
that Tima’s conditional permanent resident status automatically terminated when he 
failed to file that form.  We reject the notion that Congress intended to suborn perjury or 
that any court intended to endorse such a reading of Section 1227(a)(1)(D)(i).  While 
there may be circumstances where an alien is charged with marriage fraud and it is still 
appropriate for him to file a Form I-751, this is not such a case.  Insofar as the IJ or the 
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BIA based the determination that Tima is removable on his failure to file a Form I-751, 
that conclusion cannot stand.  As the Department of Homeland Security’s own lawyer 
effectively pointed out during a hearing before the IJ, that position is untenable.  (See 
A.R. at 75 (“[A]n I-751 was not filed.  … [A]nd logically one wouldn’t have been, he 
was convicted of marriage fraud.”).)  Thus, the BIA on remand may not rely on Tima’s 
failure to file a Form I-751 as a basis for his removal, regardless of whether the fraud 
waiver in Section 1227(a)(1)(H) extends to that failure. 
 We also decline to decide whether Section 1227(a)(1)(H)’s fraud waiver extends 
to the CIMT charge.4  The government argues that this claim remains unexhausted.  But, 
as we have explained above, Tima did sufficiently exhaust it.  The government is correct, 
however, that he has not exhausted the argument that he is eligible for a waiver under 
                                              
 4 A fraud waiver forgives both the entry fraud and all grounds for removal 
“directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).  
Specifically, Section 1227(a)(1)(H) provides, “The provisions of this paragraph relating 
to the removal of aliens … may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived ... . 
A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted under this subparagraph shall 
also operate to waive removal based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting 
from such fraud or misrepresentation.”  A number of our sister courts, relying on the first 
clause  –  “the provision of this paragraph” − have determined that the “resulting from” 
part of the fraud waiver provision, despite its unqualified language, only includes other 
grounds for removal that also happen to be contained in Section 1227(a)(1).  See, e.g., 
Tagger v. Holder, 736 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2013); Gourche v. Holder, 663 F.3d 882, 
886-87 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Vasquez, 602 F.3d at 1011-12 (“First, § [1227(a)(1)(H)] 
provides that ‘the provisions of this paragraph relating to the removal of aliens within the 
United States on the ground that they were inadmissible at the time of admission as aliens 
described in the fraud provision may be waived.’ ‘This paragraph’ refers to 
§ [1227(a)(1).]”) (emphasis and alterations omitted); Fayzullina v. Holder, No. 13-4335, 
2015 WL 64641, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2015).  Because we remand this case based on the 
erroneous ruling regarding Form I-751 and because that remand permits Tima to pursue 
an additional basis for relief on the CIMT charge, namely the Section 1182(h) waiver, we 
need not address this question, which could, if the BIA affords Tima discretionary relief 
under Section 1182(h), be wholly moot.  
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Section 1182(h) for the CIMT charge because he never raised it before the IJ or the BIA. 
Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (exhaustion applies on an issue-
by-issue basis and the failure to exhaust one issue does not result in failure to exhaust 
another that was properly presented).  We thus lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
eligibility for a waiver under that specific statutory subsection.  Because we will grant 
Tima’s petition on a different basis and because we decline to reach the merits of the 
Section 1182(h) claim, the BIA will have an opportunity to consider it for the first time 
on remand, thus allowing Tima the chance to properly exhaust it.  See Higgs v. Att’y 
Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 338 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The [g]overnment also argues that the 
claim that [the petitioner] is not a Bahamian citizen is unexhausted because it was never 
presented to the IJ or the BIA at all.  Because we decline to reach the merits of this claim, 
the Board will have an opportunity to consider it for the first time on remand, thus 
allowing [the petitioner] to properly exhaust this claim.”).  In light of our conclusion as to 
the Form I-751 issue, if the BIA granted the Section 1182(h) waiver, it could render moot 
the question of whether § 1227(a)(1)(H) applies to the CIMT charge.  
III. Conclusion   
 For the forgoing reasons, we will deny the government’s motion to dismiss, grant 
Tima’s petition, and remand this matter to the BIA for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
